| scholarly article | Q13442814 |
| P819 | ADS bibcode | 2011PNAS..10811375M |
| P356 | DOI | 10.1073/PNAS.1105604108 |
| P932 | PMC publication ID | 3136302 |
| P698 | PubMed publication ID | 21670285 |
| P5875 | ResearchGate publication ID | 51216391 |
| P2093 | author name string | Robert Boyd | |
| Sarah Mathew | |||
| P2860 | cites work | Parochial altruism in humans. | Q52009135 |
| Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups | Q56156488 | ||
| Can race be erased? Coalitional computation and social categorization | Q24555044 | ||
| Did warfare among ancestral hunter-gatherers affect the evolution of human social behaviors? | Q28247480 | ||
| Cooperative breeding in South American hunter-gatherers | Q28255611 | ||
| Culture and the evolution of human cooperation | Q33347961 | ||
| Positive interactions promote public cooperation. | Q33871627 | ||
| Costly punishment across human societies | Q33997062 | ||
| Cultural variation in Africa: role of mechanisms of transmission and adaptation | Q34067615 | ||
| Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare | Q34112945 | ||
| Reciprocity: weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate | Q34250636 | ||
| Game theory and human evolution: a critique of some recent interpretations of experimental games | Q34491501 | ||
| Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment. | Q34643452 | ||
| Winners don't punish. | Q36538342 | ||
| Indirect reciprocity provides only a narrow margin of efficiency for costly punishment | Q43211939 | ||
| The coevolution of parochial altruism and war. | Q50883515 | ||
| P433 | issue | 28 | |
| P407 | language of work or name | English | Q1860 |
| P921 | main subject | cooperation | Q380962 |
| P304 | page(s) | 11375-11380 | |
| P577 | publication date | 2011-06-13 | |
| P1433 | published in | Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America | Q1146531 |
| P1476 | title | Punishment sustains large-scale cooperation in prestate warfare | |
| P478 | volume | 108 |
| Q28727898 | A novel mammalian social structure in Indo-Pacific bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops sp.): complex male alliances in an open social network |
| Q38563032 | A simple rule for the evolution of contingent cooperation in large groups |
| Q34637805 | A structured approach to a diagnostic of collective practices |
| Q92947235 | Acculturation drives the evolution of intergroup conflict |
| Q60629395 | An economic experiment reveals that humans prefer pool punishment to maintain the commons |
| Q33360570 | An evolutionary theory of large-scale human warfare: Group-structured cultural selection |
| Q102058303 | Assessment during Intergroup Contests |
| Q58091416 | Bands of brothers and in-laws: Waorani warfare, marriage and alliance formation |
| Q46265925 | Bonobos respond prosocially toward members of other groups |
| Q34408390 | Both loved and feared: third party punishers are viewed as formidable and likeable, but these reputational benefits may only be open to dominant individuals |
| Q46193435 | Changing social norm compliance with noninvasive brain stimulation. |
| Q102369449 | Children punish third parties to satisfy both consequentialist and retributive motives |
| Q30574486 | Climate variability and conflict risk in East Africa, 1990-2009. |
| Q36250528 | Collective action problem in heterogeneous groups |
| Q37086742 | Competition for Cooperation: variability, benefits and heritability of relational wealth in hunter-gatherers |
| Q51799178 | Cooperation and conflict: field experiments in Northern Ireland. |
| Q89620321 | Cooperation in Groups of Different Sizes: The Effects of Punishment and Reputation-Based Partner Choice |
| Q44656352 | Cultural group selection plays an essential role in explaining human cooperation: A sketch of the evidence. |
| Q35449995 | Different selection pressures give rise to distinct ethnic phenomena : a functionalist framework with illustrations from the Peruvian Altiplano |
| Q41532546 | Do we harm others even if we don't need to? |
| Q33976021 | Does competition really bring out the worst? Testosterone, social distance and inter-male competition shape parochial altruism in human males |
| Q27694516 | Economic and evolutionary hypotheses for cross-population variation in parochialism |
| Q30394848 | Evolving righteousness in a corrupt world |
| Q42259865 | Fair and unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game |
| Q54093482 | Female monkeys use both the carrot and the stick to promote male participation in intergroup fights. |
| Q50229028 | Five-year-olds punish antisocial adults |
| Q37379652 | Formation of raiding parties for intergroup violence is mediated by social network structure |
| Q47409748 | Functional Interdependence Theory: An Evolutionary Account of Social Situations. |
| Q89531894 | Human large-scale cooperation as a product of competition between cultural groups |
| Q41873913 | If we are all cultural Darwinians what's the fuss about? Clarifying recent disagreements in the field of cultural evolution |
| Q41713585 | Impartial institutions, pathogen stress and the expanding social network. |
| Q37281643 | In-group defense, out-group aggression, and coordination failures in intergroup conflict. |
| Q58803639 | Inequality as information: Wealth homophily facilitates the evolution of cooperation |
| Q34737574 | Institutions, parasites and the persistence of in-group preferences |
| Q36323110 | Inter-Group Conflict and Cooperation: Field Experiments Before, During and After Sectarian Riots in Northern Ireland |
| Q28607821 | Leadership solves collective action problems in small-scale societies |
| Q89024539 | Learning moral values: Another's desire to punish enhances one's own punitive behavior |
| Q34601362 | Lethal coalitionary aggression and long-term alliance formation among Yanomamö men |
| Q47753974 | Love or fear: can punishment promote cooperation? |
| Q89013835 | Male monkeys use punishment and coercion to de-escalate costly intergroup fights |
| Q39428904 | Meeting now suggests we will meet again: implications for debates on the evolution of cooperation |
| Q58643559 | Moral Action as Cheater Suppression in Human Superorganisms |
| Q30524950 | No third-party punishment in chimpanzees |
| Q28680222 | Nonlinear effects of group size on collective action and resource outcomes |
| Q92091970 | Normative foundations of human cooperation |
| Q30275977 | Parsing the Behavioral and Brain Mechanisms of Third-Party Punishment |
| Q93064987 | People prefer coordinated punishment in cooperative interactions |
| Q60044193 | Privatisation rescues function following loss of cooperation |
| Q27007016 | Punishment and cooperation in nature |
| Q105612828 | Punishment: one tool, many uses |
| Q47178065 | Quantitative historical analysis uncovers a single dimension of complexity that structures global variation in human social organization. |
| Q93537244 | Reply to Baumard and Liénard: Mechanistic accounts need to specify why reputation systems yield cooperative outcomes on observed scales |
| Q37379862 | Resource scarcity drives lethal aggression among prehistoric hunter-gatherers in central California |
| Q42925126 | Second- or third-party punishment? When self-interest hides behind apparent functional interventions |
| Q42535670 | Solving the puzzle of human warfare requires an explanation of battle raids and cultural institutions |
| Q92955650 | Spoils division rules shape aggression between natural groups |
| Q56769434 | Strong reciprocity is real, but there is no evidence that uncoordinated costly punishment sustains cooperation in the wild |
| Q125097368 | Territorial and Nonterritorial Routes to Power: Reconciling Evolutionary Ecological, Social Agency, and Historicist Approaches |
| Q39074486 | The Evolution of Human Uniqueness |
| Q47316359 | The Evolutionary Psychology of War: Offense and Defense in the Adapted Mind |
| Q90776553 | The dual evolutionary foundations of political ideology |
| Q46737163 | The economic origins of ultrasociality |
| Q36597191 | The evolution of altruistic social preferences in human groups |
| Q51391553 | The evolution of anti-social rewarding and its countermeasures in public goods games. |
| Q48063857 | The implicit rules of combat |
| Q51491380 | The insectan apes. |
| Q53757473 | The language of cooperation: shared intentionality drives variation in helping as a function of group membership. |
| Q28727786 | The pace of cultural evolution |
| Q34250644 | The punishment that sustains cooperation is often coordinated and costly |
| Q34979249 | The role of rewards in motivating participation in simple warfare |
| Q51824168 | The two sides of warfare: an extended model of altruistic behavior in ancestral human intergroup conflict. |
| Q50531188 | Third-party punishment as a costly signal of trustworthiness. |
| Q33627311 | Third-party punishment increases cooperation in children through (misaligned) expectations and conditional cooperation |
| Q35542697 | To punish or to leave: distinct cognitive processes underlie partner control and partner choice behaviors |
| Q64957998 | Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation Altered Voluntary Cooperative Norms Compliance Under Equal Decision-Making Power. |
| Q49568190 | Two types of aggression in human evolution |
| Q33562314 | Voluntary rewards mediate the evolution of pool punishment for maintaining public goods in large populations |
| Q34985391 | Warfare and reproductive success in a tribal population |
| Q34140564 | Warriors and peacekeepers: testing a biosocial implicit leadership hypothesis of intergroup relations using masculine and feminine faces |
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