Does the sole description of a tax authority affect tax evasion?--the impact of described coercive and legitimate power

scientific article published on 29 April 2015

Does the sole description of a tax authority affect tax evasion?--the impact of described coercive and legitimate power is …
instance of (P31):
scholarly articleQ13442814

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P356DOI10.1371/JOURNAL.PONE.0123355
P932PMC publication ID4414547
P698PubMed publication ID25923770
P5875ResearchGate publication ID275660732

P50authorMartina Hartner-TiefenthalerQ59694539
Barbara HartlQ59694541
Erich KirchlerQ19960089
P2093author name stringKatharina Gangl
Eva Hofmann
P2860cites workCoercive power and forces affecting conformityQ78841056
The social side of sanctions: personal and social norms as moderators of deterrenceQ81242573
Crime and Punishment: An Economic ApproachQ55933369
Conceptualizing and Measuring a Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence1Q56137803
Tax compliance and obedience to authority at home and in the lab: A new experimental approachQ56267080
Explaining the nature of power: a three-process theoryQ56386721
z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experimentsQ56553950
A STRUCTURAL EQUATIONS MODEL OF LEADER POWER, SUBORDINATES' STYLES OF HANDLING CONFLICT, AND JOB PERFORMANCEQ56675769
Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysisQ57338599
Trust and power as determinants of tax compliance: Testing the assumptions of the slippery slope framework in Austria, Hungary, Romania and RussiaQ57659963
Getting the word out: Enforcement information dissemination and compliance behaviorQ57764360
When do severe sanctions enhance compliance? The role of procedural fairnessQ58058304
A Field Experiment in Charitable Contribution: The Impact of Social Information on the Voluntary Provision of Public GoodsQ59238297
If cooperation is likely punish mildly: insights from economic experiments based on the snowdrift gameQ34760665
Morals matter in economic gamesQ35072514
Enhancing Tax Compliance through Coercive and Legitimate Power of Tax Authorities by Concurrently Diminishing or Facilitating Trust in Tax AuthoritiesQ35693555
Tax authorities' interaction with taxpayers: A conception of compliance in social dilemmas by power and trustQ42122609
P275copyright licenseCreative Commons Attribution 4.0 InternationalQ20007257
P6216copyright statuscopyrightedQ50423863
P433issue4
P407language of work or nameEnglishQ1860
P921main subjecttax evasionQ6502151
P304page(s)e0123355
P577publication date2015-04-29
P1433published inPLOS OneQ564954
P1476titleDoes the sole description of a tax authority affect tax evasion?--the impact of described coercive and legitimate power
P478volume10

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cites work (P2860)
Q41959461Authorities' Coercive and Legitimate Power: The Impact on Cognitions Underlying Cooperation
Q38840612Coercive and legitimate authority impact tax honesty: evidence from behavioral and ERP experiments
Q64267393The Relationship Between Austrian Tax Auditors and Self-Employed Taxpayers: Evidence From a Qualitative Study

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