scholarly article | Q13442814 |
P50 | author | Martina Hartner-Tiefenthaler | Q59694539 |
Barbara Hartl | Q59694541 | ||
Erich Kirchler | Q19960089 | ||
P2093 | author name string | Katharina Gangl | |
Eva Hofmann | |||
P2860 | cites work | Coercive power and forces affecting conformity | Q78841056 |
The social side of sanctions: personal and social norms as moderators of deterrence | Q81242573 | ||
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach | Q55933369 | ||
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Tax compliance and obedience to authority at home and in the lab: A new experimental approach | Q56267080 | ||
Explaining the nature of power: a three-process theory | Q56386721 | ||
z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments | Q56553950 | ||
A STRUCTURAL EQUATIONS MODEL OF LEADER POWER, SUBORDINATES' STYLES OF HANDLING CONFLICT, AND JOB PERFORMANCE | Q56675769 | ||
Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis | Q57338599 | ||
Trust and power as determinants of tax compliance: Testing the assumptions of the slippery slope framework in Austria, Hungary, Romania and Russia | Q57659963 | ||
Getting the word out: Enforcement information dissemination and compliance behavior | Q57764360 | ||
When do severe sanctions enhance compliance? The role of procedural fairness | Q58058304 | ||
A Field Experiment in Charitable Contribution: The Impact of Social Information on the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods | Q59238297 | ||
If cooperation is likely punish mildly: insights from economic experiments based on the snowdrift game | Q34760665 | ||
Morals matter in economic games | Q35072514 | ||
Enhancing Tax Compliance through Coercive and Legitimate Power of Tax Authorities by Concurrently Diminishing or Facilitating Trust in Tax Authorities | Q35693555 | ||
Tax authorities' interaction with taxpayers: A conception of compliance in social dilemmas by power and trust | Q42122609 | ||
P275 | copyright license | Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International | Q20007257 |
P6216 | copyright status | copyrighted | Q50423863 |
P433 | issue | 4 | |
P407 | language of work or name | English | Q1860 |
P921 | main subject | tax evasion | Q6502151 |
P304 | page(s) | e0123355 | |
P577 | publication date | 2015-04-29 | |
P1433 | published in | PLOS One | Q564954 |
P1476 | title | Does the sole description of a tax authority affect tax evasion?--the impact of described coercive and legitimate power | |
P478 | volume | 10 |
Q41959461 | Authorities' Coercive and Legitimate Power: The Impact on Cognitions Underlying Cooperation |
Q38840612 | Coercive and legitimate authority impact tax honesty: evidence from behavioral and ERP experiments |
Q64267393 | The Relationship Between Austrian Tax Auditors and Self-Employed Taxpayers: Evidence From a Qualitative Study |
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