| P50 | author | Xiaojie Chen | Q90364732 |
| | Attila Szolnoki | Q47337308 |
| P2860 | cites work | tragedy of the commons | Q334622 |
| | Social exclusion in finite populations. | Q50586965 |
| | Interaction stochasticity supports cooperation in spatial Prisoner's dilemma. | Q50763235 |
| | Cyclic coevolution of cooperative behaviors and network structures. | Q50799055 |
| | Social diversity and promotion of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game. | Q50799067 |
| | Success-driven distribution of public goods promotes cooperation but preserves defection. | Q51503173 |
| | Topology-independent impact of noise on cooperation in spatial public goods games. | Q51708970 |
| | Critical Coarsening without Surface Tension: The Universality Class of the Voter Model | Q57874291 |
| | Participation costs dismiss the advantage of heterogeneous networks in evolution of cooperation | Q80340825 |
| | Probabilistic participation in public goods games | Q80825081 |
| | How did cooperative behavior evolve? | Q81920158 |
| | Evolving cooperation | Q83334146 |
| | Effects of heterogeneous wealth distribution on public cooperation with collective risk | Q85078293 |
| | The outbreak of cooperation among success-driven individuals under noisy conditions | Q24649489 |
| | The tragedy of the commons. The population problem has no technical solution; it requires a fundamental extension in morality | Q28255291 |
| | Climate policies under wealth inequality | Q30743411 |
| | Stern-judging: A simple, successful norm which promotes cooperation under indirect reciprocity | Q33267900 |
| | The coevolution of overconfidence and bluffing in the resource competition game | Q33362587 |
| | How wealth accumulation can promote cooperation | Q33737452 |
| | Inequality, communication, and the avoidance of disastrous climate change in a public goods game | Q33951390 |
| | Human cooperation | Q34357606 |
| | Inequality and visibility of wealth in experimental social networks | Q34493330 |
| | The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas | Q35709162 |
| | If players are sparse social dilemmas are too: Importance of percolation for evolution of cooperation. | Q35893288 |
| | High economic inequality leads higher-income individuals to be less generous | Q36435228 |
| | Evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on structured populations: a review. | Q36591165 |
| | Evolving synergetic interactions. | Q37147257 |
| | Resource heterogeneity can facilitate cooperation. | Q37250434 |
| | Coevolutionary games--a mini review. | Q37616715 |
| | Volunteering as Red Queen mechanism for cooperation in public goods games | Q38454542 |
| | Stochastic payoff evaluation increases the temperature of selection | Q42796789 |
| | Social diversity promotes the emergence of cooperation in public goods games. | Q45951269 |
| | Under high stakes and uncertainty the rich should lend the poor a helping hand. | Q47966868 |
| P275 | copyright license | Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International | Q20007257 |
| P6216 | copyright status | copyrighted | Q50423863 |
| P407 | language of work or name | English | Q1860 |
| P921 | main subject | public good | Q272458 |
| | cooperation | Q380962 |
| P304 | page(s) | 32802 | |
| P577 | publication date | 2016-09-06 | |
| P1433 | published in | Scientific Reports | Q2261792 |
| P1476 | title | Individual wealth-based selection supports cooperation in spatial public goods games | |
| P478 | volume | 6 | |