scholarly article | Q13442814 |
P356 | DOI | 10.1002/HEC.1551 |
P698 | PubMed publication ID | 19816948 |
P50 | author | Anthony T Lo Sasso | Q92507714 |
P2093 | author name string | Lorens A Helmchen | |
P2860 | cites work | Personnel Economics | Q105880241 |
Selection and Improvement: Physician Responses to Financial Incentives | Q105885339 | ||
Theory and practice in the design of physician payment incentives | Q24647872 | ||
Does pay-for-performance improve the quality of health care? | Q28257717 | ||
Impact of payment method on behaviour of primary care physicians: a systematic review | Q34162637 | ||
The effect of explicit financial incentives on physician behavior | Q34260061 | ||
Shortages of medical personnel at community health centers: implications for planned expansion | Q34498338 | ||
Effects of paying physicians based on their relative performance for quality | Q36417103 | ||
Lessons from evaluations of purchaser pay-for-performance programs: a review of the evidence | Q37327898 | ||
Do physician remuneration schemes matter? The case of Canadian family physicians | Q43500364 | ||
Operating on commission: analyzing how physician financial incentives affect surgery rates | Q46156335 | ||
Primary care physician compensation method in medical groups: does it influence the use and cost of health services for enrollees in managed care organizations? | Q50900614 | ||
Paying for quality: providers' incentives for quality improvement. | Q54476874 | ||
Performance Pay and Productivity | Q55968630 | ||
How do doctors behave when some (but not all) of their patients are in managed care? | Q57463742 | ||
Physicians' responses to financial incentives. Evidence from a for-profit ambulatory care center | Q68741673 | ||
Custom-made versus ready-to-wear treatments: behavioral propensities in physicians' choices | Q79932021 | ||
Can You Get What You Pay For? Pay-For-Performance and the Quality of Healthcare Providers | Q105848313 | ||
P433 | issue | 11 | |
P407 | language of work or name | English | Q1860 |
P304 | page(s) | 1300-1317 | |
P577 | publication date | 2010-11-01 | |
P1433 | published in | Health Economics | Q15679024 |
P1476 | title | How sensitive is physician performance to alternative compensation schedules? Evidence from a large network of primary care clinics | |
P478 | volume | 19 |
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