Interaction rates, vital rates, background fitness and replicator dynamics: how to embed evolutionary game structure into realistic population dynamics

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Interaction rates, vital rates, background fitness and replicator dynamics: how to embed evolutionary game structure into realistic population dynamics is …
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scholarly articleQ13442814

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P8978DBLP publication IDjournals/tib/ArgasinskiB18
P356DOI10.1007/S12064-017-0257-Y
P932PMC publication ID5893772
P698PubMed publication ID29159683

P2093author name stringM Broom
K Argasinski
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P275copyright licenseCreative Commons Attribution 4.0 InternationalQ20007257
P6216copyright statuscopyrightedQ50423863
P433issue1
P921main subjectpopulation dynamicsQ904564
P304page(s)33-50
P577publication date2017-11-20
P1433published inTheory in BiosciencesQ15766643
P1476titleInteraction rates, vital rates, background fitness and replicator dynamics: how to embed evolutionary game structure into realistic population dynamics
P478volume137

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Q93252567Extrinsic Mortality Can Shape Life-History Traits, Including Senescencecites workP2860

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