scholarly article | Q13442814 |
P2093 | author name string | Daniel M T Fessler | |
Ayelet Gneezy | |||
P2860 | cites work | Did warfare among ancestral hunter-gatherers affect the evolution of human social behaviors? | Q28247480 |
Altruistic punishment in humans | Q33336818 | ||
The evolution of altruistic punishment | Q33338167 | ||
Culture and the evolution of human cooperation | Q33347961 | ||
Positive interactions promote public cooperation. | Q33871627 | ||
Reward and punishment | Q33943815 | ||
The nature of human altruism | Q34271893 | ||
Evolution of indirect reciprocity | Q34463204 | ||
Group competition, reproductive leveling, and the evolution of human altruism | Q34589353 | ||
"In-group love" and "out-group hate" as motives for individual participation in intergroup conflict: a new game paradigm | Q34768839 | ||
Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem. | Q40465301 | ||
Costly signaling and cooperation. | Q45951675 | ||
Replicator dynamics of reward & reputation in public goods games. | Q50673559 | ||
Costly punishment prevails in intergroup conflict. | Q51875251 | ||
The long-run benefits of punishment. | Q51945355 | ||
Nobody's watching? | Q56029539 | ||
The co-evolution of individual behaviors and social institutions | Q56067079 | ||
Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups | Q56156488 | ||
An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining | Q56431823 | ||
The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good | Q56446305 | ||
Third-party punishment and social norms | Q56765506 | ||
Economics. Homo experimentalis Evolves | Q81629343 | ||
P433 | issue | 1727 | |
P1104 | number of pages | 5 | |
P304 | page(s) | 219-223 | |
P577 | publication date | 2011-06-08 | |
P1433 | published in | Proceedings of the Royal Society B | Q2625424 |
P1476 | title | Conflict, sticks and carrots: war increases prosocial punishments and rewards. | |
P478 | volume | 279 |
Q36667594 | Asymmetry within social groups: division of labour and intergroup competition |
Q51799178 | Cooperation and conflict: field experiments in Northern Ireland. |
Q33976021 | Does competition really bring out the worst? Testosterone, social distance and inter-male competition shape parochial altruism in human males |
Q27694516 | Economic and evolutionary hypotheses for cross-population variation in parochialism |
Q36591165 | Evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on structured populations: a review. |
Q40489327 | Exposure to and recall of violence reduce short-term memory and cognitive control |
Q51167108 | Group size adjustment to ecological demand in a cooperative breeder. |
Q35671663 | Heterogeneous Coupling between Interdependent Lattices Promotes the Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game |
Q36323110 | Inter-Group Conflict and Cooperation: Field Experiments Before, During and After Sectarian Riots in Northern Ireland |
Q91716243 | Revisiting the form and function of conflict: Neurobiological, psychological, and cultural mechanisms for attack and defense within and between groups |
Q38428725 | Stress and the social brain: behavioural effects and neurobiological mechanisms |
Q90776553 | The dual evolutionary foundations of political ideology |
Q28658828 | The evolution of leader-follower reciprocity: the theory of service-for-prestige |
Q51198479 | The evolutionary interplay of intergroup conflict and altruism in humans: a review of parochial altruism theory and prospects for its extension. |
Q58718039 | The origins of human prosociality: Cultural group selection in the workplace and the laboratory |
Q51824168 | The two sides of warfare: an extended model of altruistic behavior in ancestral human intergroup conflict. |
Q52885740 | Threat and parochialism in intergroup relations: lab-in-the-field evidence from rural Georgia. |
Q92830254 | War increases religiosity |
Q91133155 | Warfare in an evolutionary perspective |
Q57897746 | When Push Comes to Shove: Compensating and Opportunistic Strategies in a Collective-Risk Household Energy Dilemma |
Search more.