scholarly article | Q13442814 |
P356 | DOI | 10.1111/JEB.12351 |
P698 | PubMed publication ID | 24618005 |
P50 | author | Jean-Baptiste André | Q57415558 |
P2093 | author name string | J-B André | |
P2860 | cites work | Development of cooperative relationships through increasing investment. | Q51095620 |
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Cooperation among non-relatives evolves by state-dependent generalized reciprocity. | Q51837392 | ||
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Reciprocity and communication of partner quality. | Q55172490 | ||
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Avian mobbing: byproduct mutualism not reciprocal altruism | Q57942205 | ||
The costs and benefits of resource sharing: reciprocity requires resource heterogeneity | Q58034964 | ||
No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game | Q59066554 | ||
The evolution of cooperation | Q22065515 | ||
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Punishment and cooperation in nature | Q27007016 | ||
The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I | Q28256872 | ||
Cheating and the evolutionary stability of mutualisms | Q29027807 | ||
A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game | Q29028454 | ||
Cooperation between non-kin in animal societies | Q29031982 | ||
Integrating cooperative breeding into theoretical concepts of cooperation | Q29999278 | ||
Cooperation for direct fitness benefits | Q30474165 | ||
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Variation and the response to variation as a basis for successful cooperation | Q34113609 | ||
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Social semantics: altruism, cooperation, mutualism, strong reciprocity and group selection. | Q34575748 | ||
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Why be nice? Psychological constraints on the evolution of cooperation | Q35978815 | ||
The evolution of cooperation and altruism--a general framework and a classification of models | Q36566579 | ||
Resolving the iterated prisoner's dilemma: theory and reality. | Q37877775 | ||
The evolution of reciprocity: social types or social incentives? | Q39918787 | ||
No strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated prisoner's dilemma | Q41033167 | ||
You mob my owl, I'll mob yours: birds play tit-for-tat game. | Q41248524 | ||
Stochastic dynamics of invasion and fixation | Q42084692 | ||
"It's a Wonderful Life". signaling generosity among the Ache of Paraguay | Q42629971 | ||
Altruistic cooperation during foraging by the Ache, and the evolved human predisposition to cooperate | Q42635427 | ||
Co-residence patterns in hunter-gatherer societies show unique human social structure | Q47314671 | ||
Perfect reciprocity is the only evolutionarily stable strategy in the continuous iterated prisoner's dilemma. | Q50905489 | ||
Variation in behaviour promotes cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma game. | Q51003106 | ||
Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations. | Q51003681 | ||
Are there really no evolutionarily stable strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma? | Q51056615 | ||
P433 | issue | 4 | |
P407 | language of work or name | English | Q1860 |
P921 | main subject | cooperation | Q380962 |
P1104 | number of pages | 12 | |
P304 | page(s) | 784-795 | |
P577 | publication date | 2014-03-12 | |
P1433 | published in | Journal of Evolutionary Biology | Q781831 |
P1476 | title | Mechanistic constraints and the unlikely evolution of reciprocal cooperation | |
P478 | volume | 27 |
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