| scholarly article | Q13442814 |
| P818 | arXiv ID | 1302.6742 |
| P8978 | DBLP publication ID | journals/dga/Sasaki14 |
| P356 | DOI | 10.1007/S13235-013-0094-7 |
| P932 | PMC publication ID | 4811019 |
| P698 | PubMed publication ID | 27069751 |
| P5875 | ResearchGate publication ID | 255961632 |
| P894 | zbMATH Open document ID | 1302.91025 |
| P50 | author | Tatsuya Sasaki | Q41047041 |
| P2093 | author name string | Tatsuya Sasaki | |
| P2860 | cites work | tragedy of the commons | Q334622 |
| Altruistic punishment and the origin of cooperation | Q24523644 | ||
| The option to leave: Conditional dissociation in the evolution of cooperation | Q50674562 | ||
| Iterated prisoner's dilemma in an asocial world dominated by loners, not by defectors. | Q50791045 | ||
| Cooperation and evolutionary dynamics in the public goods game with institutional incentives. | Q51539802 | ||
| The evolution of cooperation by social exclusion. | Q51543678 | ||
| Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons. | Q51679711 | ||
| Incentives and opportunism: from the carrot to the stick. | Q51706383 | ||
| Bounded rationality in volunteering public goods games. | Q51725458 | ||
| When does optional participation allow the evolution of cooperation? | Q51857100 | ||
| Constraining free riding in public goods games: designated solitary punishers can sustain human cooperation. | Q51948819 | ||
| Volunteering leads to rock–paper–scissors dynamics in a public goods game | Q52640580 | ||
| Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups | Q56156488 | ||
| The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good | Q56446305 | ||
| Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments | Q56907497 | ||
| An economic experiment reveals that humans prefer pool punishment to maintain the commons | Q60629395 | ||
| Know when to walk away: contingent movement and the evolution of cooperation | Q80591243 | ||
| Probabilistic participation in public goods games | Q80825081 | ||
| The tragedy of the commons. The population problem has no technical solution; it requires a fundamental extension in morality | Q28255291 | ||
| Positive interactions promote public cooperation. | Q33871627 | ||
| Reward and punishment | Q33943815 | ||
| Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare | Q34112945 | ||
| Punishing and abstaining for public goods. | Q34485785 | ||
| The competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions. | Q34511653 | ||
| Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment. | Q34643452 | ||
| Centralized sanctioning and legitimate authority promote cooperation in humans | Q35091025 | ||
| The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas | Q35709162 | ||
| The evolution of antisocial punishment in optional public goods games | Q35757835 | ||
| Anti-social punishment can prevent the co-evolution of punishment and cooperation | Q35790503 | ||
| Punish or perish? Retaliation and collaboration among humans | Q36982862 | ||
| Reward, punishment, and cooperation: a meta-analysis. | Q37875846 | ||
| Volunteering as Red Queen mechanism for cooperation in public goods games | Q38454542 | ||
| Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem. | Q40465301 | ||
| Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-riders | Q42146524 | ||
| Competition of individual and institutional punishments in spatial public goods games. | Q44641680 | ||
| Leaving the loners alone: evolution of cooperation in the presence of antisocial punishment. | Q45950933 | ||
| Replicator dynamics in public goods games with reward funds. | Q45950993 | ||
| Replicator dynamics for optional public good games. | Q45951633 | ||
| Evolution of altruism in optional and compulsory games | Q46123277 | ||
| Antisocial punishment across societies | Q47705930 | ||
| Social science: Carrot or stick? | Q48005220 | ||
| P275 | copyright license | Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic | Q19125117 |
| P6216 | copyright status | copyrighted | Q50423863 |
| P921 | main subject | cooperation | Q380962 |
| P6104 | maintained by WikiProject | WikiProject Mathematics | Q8487137 |
| P304 | page(s) | 345-362 | |
| P577 | publication date | 2013-08-17 | |
| P1433 | published in | Dynamic games and applications | Q27727320 |
| P1476 | title | The Evolution of Cooperation Through Institutional Incentives and Optional Participation | |
| P478 | volume | 4 |
| Q30611477 | First carrot, then stick: how the adaptive hybridization of incentives promotes cooperation |
| Q33937194 | Optimal distribution of incentives for public cooperation in heterogeneous interaction environments. |
| Q33906547 | Sanctions as honest signals--the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions. |
| Q38779450 | When is bigger better? The effects of group size on the evolution of helping behaviours |
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