| scholarly article | Q13442814 |
| P356 | DOI | 10.1016/J.JTBI.2010.07.039 |
| P953 | full work available at URL | https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00627144/file/PEER_stage2_10.1016%252Fj.jtbi.2010.07.039.pdf |
| https://api.elsevier.com/content/article/PII:S0022519310003966?httpAccept=text/xml | ||
| https://api.elsevier.com/content/article/PII:S0022519310003966?httpAccept=text/plain | ||
| P698 | PubMed publication ID | 20688083 |
| P5875 | ResearchGate publication ID | 45507482 |
| P894 | zbMATH Open document ID | 1410.91076 |
| P50 | author | Fernando Vega Redondo | Q5860362 |
| P2093 | author name string | Fernando Vega-Redondo | |
| Luis R. Izquierdo | |||
| Segismundo S. Izquierdo | |||
| P2860 | cites work | Cooperation within and among species | Q22065682 |
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| The Evolution of Trust and Cooperation between Strangers: A Computational Model | Q56080125 | ||
| On Six Advances in Cooperation Theory | Q59831200 | ||
| Cooperate with thy neighbour? | Q60066562 | ||
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| How altruism evolves: assortment and synergy | Q80117957 | ||
| Know when to walk away: contingent movement and the evolution of cooperation | Q80591243 | ||
| A simple and general explanation for the evolution of altruism | Q81918310 | ||
| How did cooperative behavior evolve? | Q81920158 | ||
| P433 | issue | 1 | |
| P407 | language of work or name | English | Q1860 |
| P921 | main subject | cooperation | Q380962 |
| cooperative behavior | Q69905246 | ||
| P6104 | maintained by WikiProject | WikiProject Mathematics | Q8487137 |
| P1104 | number of pages | 9 | |
| P304 | page(s) | 76-84 | |
| P577 | publication date | 2010-08-03 | |
| P1433 | published in | Journal of Theoretical Biology | Q2153724 |
| P1476 | title | The option to leave: Conditional dissociation in the evolution of cooperation | |
| P478 | volume | 267 |
| Q33926986 | Axelrod's metanorm games on networks |
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| Q101574076 | Defectors' intolerance of others promotes cooperation in the repeated public goods game with opting out |
| Q113295279 | Food for all: An agent-based model to explore the emergence and implications of cooperation for food storage |
| Q64106624 | Individual solutions to shared problems create a modern tragedy of the commons |
| Q33847126 | Mesoscopic effects in an agent-based bargaining model in regular lattices |
| Q51461820 | Migration and the evolution of duetting in songbirds. |
| Q37360368 | Opting out against defection leads to stable coexistence with cooperation. |
| Q46862161 | Partner switching can favour cooperation in a biological market |
| Q36658145 | Principles of cooperation across systems: from human sharing to multicellularity and cancer |
| Q47321278 | Role of generosity and forgiveness: Return to a cooperative society |
| Q39614207 | The Evolution of Cooperation Through Institutional Incentives and Optional Participation. |
| Q38779450 | When is bigger better? The effects of group size on the evolution of helping behaviours |
| Q35884918 | Why mutual helping in most natural systems is neither conflict-free nor based on maximal conflict |
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