Opting out against defection leads to stable coexistence with cooperation.

scientific article published on 24 October 2016

Opting out against defection leads to stable coexistence with cooperation. is …
instance of (P31):
scholarly articleQ13442814

External links are
P356DOI10.1038/SREP35902
P932PMC publication ID5075917
P698PubMed publication ID27775099

P50authorXiudeng ZhengQ51689108
Yi TaoQ51689114
Ross CressmanQ102168846
P2093author name stringCong Li
Bo-Yu Zhang
Song-Jia Fan
Jian-Zhang Bao
P2860cites workThe evolution of cooperationQ22065515
The option to leave: Conditional dissociation in the evolution of cooperationQ50674562
Co-evolution of behaviour and social network structure promotes human cooperation.Q51602793
Costs for switching partners reduce network dynamics but not cooperative behaviour.Q51801758
Volunteering leads to rock–paper–scissors dynamics in a public goods gameQ52640580
Evolutionary games and spatial chaosQ59066465
How altruism evolves: assortment and synergyQ80117957
Know when to walk away: contingent movement and the evolution of cooperationQ80591243
Five rules for the evolution of cooperationQ22065876
The Evolution of Reciprocal AltruismQ22066120
Dynamic social networks promote cooperation in experiments with humansQ24633223
A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networksQ24654144
Breeding together: kin selection and mutualism in cooperative vertebratesQ28213033
The genetical evolution of social behaviour. IQ28256872
Cooperation prevails when individuals adjust their social tiesQ33261001
Evolution of cooperation on stochastic dynamical networksQ33627724
Evolution of indirect reciprocityQ34463204
Evolution of cooperation by multilevel selectionQ34984209
Cooperation and assortativity with dynamic partner updatingQ36221889
Assortment of encounters and evolution of cooperativeness.Q36283671
Paradox of the evolution of communication and of social interactivityQ37608065
Volunteering as Red Queen mechanism for cooperation in public goods gamesQ38454542
Repeated games and direct reciprocity under active linking.Q40133963
Evolutionary game dynamics with non-uniform interaction ratesQ40888363
The further evolution of cooperationQ41259286
P275copyright licenseCreative Commons Attribution 4.0 InternationalQ20007257
P6216copyright statuscopyrightedQ50423863
P407language of work or nameEnglishQ1860
P921main subjectcooperationQ380962
P304page(s)35902
P577publication date2016-10-24
P1433published inScientific ReportsQ2261792
P1476titleOpting out against defection leads to stable coexistence with cooperation
P478volume6

Reverse relations

Q101574076Defectors' intolerance of others promotes cooperation in the repeated public goods game with opting outcites workP2860

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