scholarly article | Q13442814 |
P356 | DOI | 10.1038/S41598-020-76506-3 |
P698 | PubMed publication ID | 33177552 |
P50 | author | Ross Cressman | Q102168846 |
P2093 | author name string | Vlastimil Křivan | |
P2860 | cites work | An institutional mechanism for assortment in an ecology of games. | Q33995633 |
Is cooperation viable in mobile organisms? Simple Walk Away rule favors the evolution of cooperation in groups | Q35033179 | ||
Opting out against defection leads to stable coexistence with cooperation. | Q37360368 | ||
Replicator dynamics for optional public good games. | Q45951633 | ||
Interaction times change evolutionary outcomes: Two-player matrix games | Q47355414 | ||
Evolutionary stability for matrix games under time constraints. | Q47366392 | ||
The ESS and replicator equation in matrix games under time constraints. | Q47563643 | ||
The option to leave: Conditional dissociation in the evolution of cooperation | Q50674562 | ||
Social Dilemmas | Q56446309 | ||
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments | Q56907497 | ||
Beyond replicator dynamics: From frequency to density dependent models of evolutionary games | Q57467607 | ||
Bimatrix games that include interaction times alter the evolutionary outcome: The Owner-Intruder game | Q58542202 | ||
The Ideological-Conflict Hypothesis | Q60048259 | ||
Positive interactions may decrease cooperation in social dilemma experiments | Q61805611 | ||
Know when to walk away: contingent movement and the evolution of cooperation | Q80591243 | ||
A mechanism for the evolution of altruism among nonkin: positive assortment through environmental feedback | Q81791607 | ||
Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option | Q92204542 | ||
Revisiting the "fallacy of averages" in ecology: Expected gain per unit time equals expected gain divided by expected time | Q93152188 | ||
P433 | issue | 1 | |
P921 | main subject | public good | Q272458 |
cooperation | Q380962 | ||
P304 | page(s) | 19511 | |
P577 | publication date | 2020-11-11 | |
P1433 | published in | Scientific Reports | Q2261792 |
P1476 | title | Defectors' intolerance of others promotes cooperation in the repeated public goods game with opting out | |
P478 | volume | 10 |
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