| scholarly article | Q13442814 |
| P2093 | author name string | Paul Bloom | |
| Susan A J Birch | |||
| P2860 | cites work | Beliefs about beliefs: representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception | Q28271805 |
| Does the autistic child have a "theory of mind"? | Q28284990 | ||
| Mental contamination and mental correction: unwanted influences on judgments and evaluations | Q30466232 | ||
| Meta-analysis of theory-of-mind development: the truth about false belief | Q33951255 | ||
| Two reasons to abandon the false belief task as a test of theory of mind | Q34510755 | ||
| Learning words from knowledgeable versus ignorant speakers: links between preschoolers' theory of mind and semantic development | Q38439036 | ||
| Preschoolers are sensitive to the speaker's knowledge when learning proper names. | Q51958040 | ||
| Individual differences in inhibitory control and children's theory of mind. | Q51964802 | ||
| Development of an aspect of executive control: development of the abilities to remember what I said and to "do as I say, not as I do". | Q52201792 | ||
| The Curse of Knowledge in Economic Settings: An Experimental Analysis | Q57253720 | ||
| Hindsight is not equal to foresight: The effect of outcome knowledge on judgment under uncertainty | Q57253721 | ||
| P433 | issue | 3 | |
| P921 | main subject | bias | Q742736 |
| P304 | page(s) | 283-286 | |
| P577 | publication date | 2003-05-01 | |
| P1433 | published in | Psychological Science | Q7256367 |
| P1476 | title | Children are cursed: an asymmetric bias in mental-state attribution. | |
| P478 | volume | 14 |
| Q37613799 | A developmental, mentalization-based approach to the understanding and treatment of borderline personality disorder |
| Q48222550 | Absence of spontaneous action anticipation by false belief attribution in children with autism spectrum disorder |
| Q34005002 | Action anticipation through attribution of false belief by 2-year-olds. |
| Q33737198 | Attributing false beliefs about non-obvious properties at 18 months |
| Q34614830 | Atypical neural self-representation in autism |
| Q47180851 | Belief attribution in deaf and hearing infants. |
| Q46201756 | Beliefs about thought probability: evidence for persistent errors in mindreading and links to executive control |
| Q34581855 | Children's sensitivity to their own relative ignorance: handling of possibilities under epistemic and physical uncertainty. |
| Q35131421 | Do adults show a curse of knowledge in false-belief reasoning? A robust estimate of the true effect size |
| Q34471472 | Explanation and understanding |
| Q35976878 | False-belief understanding i 2.5-year-olds: evidence for violation-of-expectation change-of-location and unexpected-contents tasks |
| Q35796482 | False-belief understanding in 2.5-year-olds: evidence from two novel verbal spontaneous-response tasks |
| Q34095460 | False-belief understanding in infants |
| Q48258916 | Fitting the Message to the Listener: Children Selectively Mention General and Specific Facts. |
| Q44244676 | God-mother-baby: what children think they know |
| Q61164213 | Hearing relative clauses boosts relative clause usage (and referential clarity) in young Turkish language learners |
| Q33291563 | Hindsight bias and developing theories of mind |
| Q24605810 | Hindsight bias from 3 to 95 years of age |
| Q51909757 | Illusions of competence during study can be remedied by manipulations that enhance learners' sensitivity to retrieval conditions at test. |
| Q50790990 | Judging judges: How do children weigh the importance of capability and objectivity for being a good decision maker? |
| Q47842150 | Knowledge central: A central role for knowledge attributions in social evaluations |
| Q35757796 | Not quite as grown-up as we like to think: parallels between cognition in childhood and adulthood |
| Q36808676 | Object identification in preschool children and adults |
| Q47857599 | Older (but not younger) preschoolers understand that knowledge differs between people and across time |
| Q26768129 | Outcome Knowledge and False Belief |
| Q90303396 | Predicting others' knowledge: Knowledge estimation as cue utilization |
| Q30423973 | Preschoolers expect pointers (even ignorant ones) to be knowledgeable |
| Q55334439 | Preschoolers’ Development of Theory of Mind: The Contribution of Understanding Psychological Causality in Stories. |
| Q35840068 | Processing Demands Impact 3-Year-Olds' Performance in a Spontaneous-Response Task: New Evidence for the Processing-Load Account of Early False-Belief Understanding |
| Q49048310 | Show or tell: testimony is sufficient to induce the curse of knowledge in three- and four-year-olds |
| Q37879297 | Spontaneous theory of mind and its absence in autism spectrum disorders |
| Q34638680 | The curse of knowledge in reasoning about false beliefs |
| Q34554119 | The development of cynicism |
| Q51794275 | The development of preschoolers' appreciation of communicative ambiguity. |
| Q31105463 | The parent-infant dyad and the construction of the subjective self |
| Q47990698 | The relation between spatial perspective taking and inhibitory control in 6-year-old children |
| Q34142535 | The role of the self in mindblindness in autism |
| Q47289801 | Tracking speakers' false beliefs: is theory of mind available earlier for word learning? |
| Q38566179 | Unraveling the paradox of the autistic self |
| Q34308605 | We saw it all along: visual hindsight bias in children and adults |
| Q47216419 | Where will the triangle look for it? Attributing false beliefs to a geometric shape at 17 months |
| Q33486709 | Which penguin is this? Attributing false beliefs about object identity at 18 months |
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